Abstract. The counterfeit coin problem requires us to find all false coins from a given bunch of coins using a balance scale. We assume that the balance scale gives us only "balanced" or "tilted" information and that we know the number k of false coins in advance. The balance scale can be modeled by a certain type of oracle and its query complexity is a measure for the cost of weighing algorithms (the number of weighings). In this paper, we study the quantum query complexity for this problem. Let Q(k, N ) be the quantum query complexity of finding all k false coins from the N given coins. We show that for any k and N such that k < N/2, Q(k, N ) = O(k 1/4 ), contrasting with the classical query complexity, Ω(k log(N/k)), that depends on N . So our quantum algorithm achieves a quartic speed-up for this problem. We do not have a matching lower bound, but we show some evidence that the upper bound is tight: any algorithm, including our algorithm, that satisfies certain properties needs Ω(k 1/4 ) queries.
Introduction
Exponential speed-ups by quantum algorithms have been highly celebrated, but their specific examples are not too many. In contrast, almost every unstructured search problem can be sped up simply by using amplitude amplification [8, 5, 6] , providing a huge number of combinatorial problems for which quantum algorithms are quadratically faster than classical ones. Interestingly there are few examples in between. (For instance, [7] provides a cubic speed-up while their classical lower bound is not known.) The reason is probably that the amplitude amplification is too general to combine with other methods appropriately. In fact we know few such cases including the one by [14] where they improved a simple Grover search algorithm for triangle finding by using clever combinatorial ideas (but unfortunately still less than quadratically compared to the best classical algorithm). This paper achieves a quartic speed-up for a well-known combinatorial problem.
The counterfeit coin problem is a mathematical puzzle whose origin dates back to 1945; in the American Mathematical Monthly, 52, p. 46, E. Schell posed the following question which is probably one of the oldest questions about the complexity of algorithms: "You have eight similar coins and a beam balance. At most one coin is counterfeit and hence underweight. How can you detect whether there is an underweight coin, and if so, which one, using the balance only twice?" The puzzle immediately fascinated many people and since then there have been several different versions and extensions in the literature (see e.g., [15, 9, 10, 13] ). This paper considers the quantum version of this problem, which, a bit surprisingly, has not appeared in the literature. To make our model simple, we assume that we cannot obtain information on which side is heavier when the scale is tilted. So, the balance scale gives us only binary information, balanced (i.e., two sets of coins on the two pans are equal in weight) or tilted (different in weight). Our goal is to detect the false coin with a minimum number of weighings. The problem is naturally extended to the case that there are two or more (= k that is known in advance) false coins with equal weight. For the simplest case that k = 1, the following easy (classic) algorithm exists: We put (approximately) N/4 coins on both pans. If the scale is tilted, then we know the the number (not the parity) of 1's in the string [19] . Also, [19] presented a single-query quantum algorithm for the binary search problem under the IP oracle, which is essentially based on the same idea as the k = 1 case of our problem mentioned above.
The quantum adversary method, which is used for B-oracles in this paper, was first introduced by Ambainis [1] for the standard oracle. Many variants have followed including weighted adversary methods [2, 20] , spectral adversary method [3] , Kolmogorov complexity method [12] , all of which were shown to be equivalent [18] . After Høyer et al. [11] introduced a stronger quantum adversary method called the negative adversary method, Reichardt [16, 17] showed that this method is "optimal" for any Boolean function.
Models. A B-oracle is a binary string x = x 1 · · · x N where x i = 1 (resp. = 0) means that the i-th coin is false (resp. fair). For instance, the string 0001 for N = 4 means that the fourth coin is a unique false coin. A query to the oracle is given as a string q = q 1 · · · q N ∈ {0, 1, −1} N that must be in the set Q (B) =
⌊N/2⌋
l=0 Q l where Q l is the set of strings q such that q has exactly l 1's and l −1's. Here, 1 (or −1, resp.) in the i-th component means that we place the i-th coin on the left pan (on the right pan, resp.) and 0 means that the i-th coin is not placed on either pan. The answer from the oracle is represented by a binary value χ(x; q) where χ(x; q) = 0 means the scale is balanced, that is, q 1 x 1 + . . . + q N x N = 0 and χ(x; q) = 1 means it is tilted, that is,
In quantum computation, the B-oracle is viewed as a unitary transformation O B,x . Namely, O B,x transforms |q to (−1) χ(x;q) |q . Throughout this paper, we assume that k < N/2 since our B-oracle model is unable to distinguish any N -bit string x fromx (the bit string obtained by flipping all bits of x).
Upper Bounds
Here is our main result in this paper:
Theorem 1
The quantum query complexity for finding k false coins among N coins is O(k 1/4 ).
Notice that our algorithm is exact, i.e., its output must be correct with probability one to compare our result with the classical case (which has been often studied in the exact setting). Since we use exact amplitude amplification [6] to make our algorithm exact, the assumption that k is known is necessary. But it should be noted that our bounded-error algorithm described in this section works even for unknown k. Also, we note that our algorithm can be easily adapted so that it works when the output of the balance is ternary (while we assume it is binary for simplicity).
Before the proof, we first describe our basic approach, a simulation of the IP oracle by the B-oracle. Recall that the IP oracle (Inner Product oracle) [4] transforms a prequery state | q R to (−1) q·x | q R , where q ∈ {0, 1} N in register R is a query string and x ∈ {0, 1} N is an oracle. Then the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm (the Hadamard transform) retrieves the string x and we know the k false coins in the case of our problem. Observe that the IP oracle flips the phase of each state if and only if q · x is odd, in other words, if and only if a multiset M ( q, x) := {x i | q i = 1} includes an odd number of 1's (or false coins in our case). If k = 1, then M ( q, x) includes at most one 1. Hence we can simply replace the IP oracle with the query sequence q by the B-oracle with a query sequence q such that an arbitrarily one half (the first one half, for instance) of the 1's in q are changed to −1's, meaning the one half of the coins in M ( q, x) go to the left pan and the remaining one half to the right pan. (As shown in a moment, we can assume without loss of generality that q includes an even number of 1's.)
Now we consider the general (k ≥ 1) case. If M ( q, x) includes odd 1's, then the scale is tilted for any such q mentioned above; this is desirable for us. If M ( q, x) includes even 1's, we wish the scale to be balanced. In order for this to happen, however, we must divide the (unknown) false coins in M ( q, x) into the two pans evenly, for which there are no obvious ways other than using randomization. Our idea is to introduce the second register, R ′ , as follows: On R ′ , we prepare, with being entangled to each state q in R, a superposition of all possible states q 1 ( q), q 2 ( q), . . . , q h ( q), obtained by flipping one half of 1's in q into −1's. By using this superposition as a query to the B-oracle, we can achieve a success (being able to detect the scale is balanced) probability of 1/ √ m, where m is the number of false coins in M ( q, x). In order to increase this probability, we can use copies of register R ′ or, more efficiently, quantum amplitude amplification [6] .
As suggested before, we begin with the restriction of the IP oracle without losing its power. The parity-restricted query means that the Hamming weights of all superposed queries q, denoted by wt( q), are even. Proof. For a given oracle x ∈ S <N/2 , define
where Q even = { q ∈ {0, 1} N | wt( q) = 0 mod 2}. Then the Hadamard transform of |ψ x , H|ψ x , can be rewritten as follows:
Note that the last equality in the above equations holds; the second term must vanish because the first term already has a unit length. For any x = y, H|ψ x = (|x + |x )/ √ 2 and H|ψ y = (|y + |ȳ )/ √ 2 are orthogonal since x =ȳ by the restriction of their Hamming weights. This implies that |ψ x is orthogonal to |ψ y for any x = y, and hence there is a unitary transformation W : |x → |ψ x . Thus we can design an algorithm similar to Bernstein-Vazirani [4] just replacing the Hadamard transform by W . For a concrete (polynomial-time) construction of W, see Appendix A. Now we give the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. For exposition, we first give a bounded-error algorithm (F ind * (k)) and then make it exact (F ind(k)). In what follows, for a query string q, let I( q) be the set of indices i such that q i = 1. This set specifies which wt( q) coins of the N coins are placed on the two pans. Let P I( q) be the set of all partitions of the set I( q) of size wt( q) (= even by Lemma 1) into two sets of size wt( q)/2. Note that each partition (Y, Y ) in P I( q) specifies how to split the wt( q) coins in half to place them on the left and right pans, and can be identified with the corresponding query q to the B-oracle. Finally, let χ(Y, Y ) be the answer for the query (Y, Y ) ∈ P I( q) to the B-oracle.
Algorithm F ind * (k).
1. Prepare N qubits |0 ⊗N in a register R, and apply a unitary transformation W of Lemma 1 to them. Then, we have the state
For each superposed q, implement Steps 2.1-2.4 on a register R ′ using q as a control part.
2.1. Apply a unitary transformation A q to the initial state |0 on R ′ to create a quantum state
|Y, Y R ′ , which represents a uniform superposition of all partitions (Y, Y ) in P I( q) . Then, the current state is
where Q e (resp. Q o ) denotes the set of all q's such that M ( q, x) includes an even (resp. odd) number
2.2. Let χ be the Boolean function defined by χ(Y, Y ) = 1 if and only if χ(Y, Y ) = 0 (that is, the scale is balanced). Then, under the above A q and χ, run the amplitude amplification algorithm QSearch(A q , χ) when the initial success probability of A q is unknown (Theorem 3 in [6] ). Here "success" means the scale is balanced and hence we use χ, not χ, in QSearch. Then we obtain a state in the form of
where |g Y is the garbage state. Note that, in the first term, the amplitudes β Y such that χ(Y, Y ) = 1 are now large by amplitude amplification while the second term does not change since the scale is always tilted.
If
Step 2.2 finds a "solution," i.e., a partition (Y, Y ) such that χ(Y, Y ) = 1, then do nothing. Otherwise, flip the phase (and then the phase is kick-backed into R). Notice that when M ( q, x) includes an odd number of 1's, the phase is always flipped, while when it includes an even number of 1's, the phase is not flipped with high amplitude. Now the current state is
Reverse the quantum transformation done in Steps 2.1 and 2.2. Notice that the reversible transformation is done on R ′ in parallel for each q while the contents of R does not change since it is the control part. Therefore, the state becomes
where |err ′ q R ′ is the transformed state of |err q R ′ . 3. Apply W −1 to the state in R. Then we obtain a final state
Then measure R in the computational basis. (End of Algorithm)
For justifying the correctness of F ind * (k), it suffices to show that the squared magnitude of the second term of |ξ 3 is a small constant, say, 1/400, since we then measure the desired value x with probability at least 9/10 (in fact, at least (1 − 1/400) 2 > 9/10). By the unitarity, its squared magnitude is equal to that of the last term of |ξ 2, 3 , that is, we want to evaluate the following value ǫ.
Lemma 2 ǫ is at most 1/400.
By Theorem 3 in [6] , it is guaranteed that, in the algorithm QSearch(A q , χ), an expected number of applications of the Grover-like subroutine to find a "solution," i.e., a partition (
, and (iv) the transformation U 0 defined by U 0 |z = |z if z = 0 and −|z if z = 0, where A q (and hence its inverse) and U 0 can be implemented without any query to the B-oracle, and O χ can be implemented with one query to the B-oracle. Thus the expected number of queries to find a "solution" is O(k 1/4 ). By setting the number of applications of the subroutine to c 0 k 1/4 where c 0 is a large constant,
Step 2.2 finds a "solution" with probability at least 1599/1600. This means that for any q ∈
has squared magnitude at most 1/1600. Recalling
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Finally, it is easy to see from the above proof that the query complexity of
Step 2 and no queries in Steps 1 and 3. Now we consider the exact algorithm F ind(k). By the symmetric structure of algorithm F ind * (k), the success probability of identifying x correctly is independent of x (recall that the oracle candidates are N k N -bit strings x with Hamming weight k). Thus we can use the so-called exact amplitude amplification algorithm (Theorem 4 in [6] ) to convert it into the exact algorithm.
Here is the brief description of F ind(k). (see Appendix B for the details). First, we implement F ind * (k). As shown above, F ind * (k) produces the correct output (i.e., k false coins) with a constant probability (≥ 9/10) larger than 1/4. Notice that we can make the success probability exactly 1/4 by an appropriate adjustment. We need an algorithm for checking if the output is correct to amplify the success probability to 1. Namely, an algorithm Check needs to judge whether k coins are indeed all false, which can be implemented classically in O(log k) weighings (as seen in Appendix B). Then we can implement the exact amplitude amplification: Like the 1/4-Grover's algorithm [5] , flip the phase if Check judges that the output is correct, and apply the reflection about the state obtained after F ind * (k). It is not difficult to see that F ind(k) always finds k false coins and the total complexity is O(k 1/4 ). Therefore, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. 2 3 Lower Bounds
Basic Ideas
In this section, we discuss the lower bound of finding k false coins from N coins. We conjecture that the upper bound O(k 1/4 ) is tight but, unfortunately, we have not been able to show whether it is true or not. Instead, we show that if there would be an algorithm that improves the upper bound essentially, then it would have a completely different structure from our algorithm. Before describing our results, we observe two properties of our algorithm F ind(k). First, F ind(k) essentially uses only "big pans," i.e., it always places at least Ω(N ) coins on the pans, which is called the big-pan property. (The algorithm F ind * (k) in Section 2 uses "small pans" but it can be adapted with no essential change so that it works even if the size of pans must be big, as easily shown in Appendix B.) Second, the B-oracle is always used in such a way that once the coins placed on the two pans are determined, the partition of them into the two pans is done uniformly at random, which is called the random-partition property. What we show in this section is that the current upper bound is best achievable for any algorithm that satisfies at least one of these two properties.
For this purpose, we revisit one version of the (nonnegative) quantum adversary method, called the strong weighted adversary method in [18] , due to Zhang [20] . Let f be a function from a finite set S to another finite set S ′ . Recall that in a query complexity model, an input x ∈ S is given as an oracle. An algorithm A would like to compute f (x) while it can obtain the information about x by a unitary transformation O x |q, a, z = |q, a ⊕ ζ(x; q), z , where |q is the register for a query string q from a finite set Q, |a is the register for the binary answer ζ(x; q), a function from S × Q to {0, 1}, and |z is the work register. Note that the adversary method usually assumes the so-called index oracle, namely q is an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ N and ζ(x; q) is the ith bit (0 or 1) of x ∈ {0, 1} N . However, one can easily see that the above generalization to ζ(x; q) requires no essential changes for its proof. Thus Theorem 14 of [20] can be restated as follows:
Lemma 3 Let w, w ′ denote a weight scheme as follows:
1. Every pair (x, y) ∈ S × S is assigned a nonnegative weight w(x, y) = w(y, x) that satisfies w(x, y) = 0 whenever f (x) = f (y).
2. Every triple (x, y, q) ∈ S × S × Q is assigned a nonnegative weight w ′ (x, y, q) that satisfies w ′ (x, y, q) = 0 whenever ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q) or f (x) = f (y), and w ′ (x, y, q)w ′ (y, x, q) ≥ w 2 (x, y) for all x, y, q such that ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q) and f (x) = f (y).
For all x, q, let µ(x) = y w(x, y) and ν(x, q) = y w ′ (x, y, q). Then, the quantum query complexity of f is at least 
Big Pan Lower Bounds
First, we show that our upper bound is tight under the big-pan property. In what follows, L ≥ l denotes the restriction that at least l coins must be placed on the pans whenever the balance is used. Proof. Let l = N/d. Then the lower bound we should show is Ω((k/d) 1/4 ). We can assume that d ≤ k/3 (otherwise, the lower bound becomes trivial). To use Lemma 3, let S = {x ∈ {0, 1} N | wt(x) = k}, Q = Q ≥N/d := l≥N/d Q l , ζ(x; q) = χ(x; q), and f (x) = x. Our weight scheme is as follows: Let w(x, y) = 1 for any pair (x, y) ∈ S × S such that x = y, and let w ′ (x, y, q) = 1 for all (x, y, q) ∈ S × S × Q ≥N/d such that χ(x; q) = χ(y; q) and x = y. It is easy to check that this satisfies the condition of a weight scheme. Then, for any x, we have µ(x) = y w(x, y) = N k − 1. We need to evaluate ν(x, q)ν(y, q) for pairs (x, y) such that χ(x; q) = 1 and χ(y; q) = 0 or χ(x; q) = 0 and χ(y; q) = 1. Fix q ∈ Q ≥N/d arbitrarily and assume that q ∈ Q N/c where c ≤ d. When χ(x; q) = 1 (i.e., the scale is tilted for query q when x is the input), notice that ν(x, q) = y w ′ (x, y, q) is the number of all y's such that the scale is balanced when N/c coins are placed on each of the two pans according to q. Therefore, by summing up all the cases such that those N/c coins include m false ones,
Since χ(y; q) = 0, we have ν(y, q) = x w ′ (x, y, q) = 
Then, we can show the following lemma.
Proof. Note that γ(N, k, c)/
N k means the probability that the scale is balanced when N/c coins (N coins include k false ones) are randomly placed on each of the two pans, and hence its value decreases as c approaches to 2. So, it suffices to prove the lemma for c ≥ 4.
Let us denote each term in the sum γ(N, k, c) by t(m) = N/c m
for m = 0, 1, . . . , k/2. We divide γ(N, k, c) into the two parts, that is, we write γ(N, k, c) = T >k/2c + T ≤k/2c where T >k/2c = m:m>k/2c t(m) and T ≤k/2c = m:m≤k/2c t(m). 
. Now we verify that r(k/2c − 1) > 4. In fact, since c ≤ k/3 < 2 + k/2, we have
and
Thus we obtain
≥ 4 (by Eq. (3)).
These facts imply that
which is bounded by (4/3)t(k/c) since t(m) takes the maximum value when m = k/c. Calculating t(k/c)/ N k using the Stirling formula n! ∼ √ 2πn(N/e) N , we obtain On the contrary, we can show that any algorithm that uses only "small pans" also needs Ω(k 1/4 ) queries (Theorem 5). For instance, we cannot break the current bound k 1/4 by any algorithm that places O(N/k) coins on the pans. (Notice that the pan includes only a constant number of false coins with high probability in this case and therefore we can achieve a better success probability for the even false-coin case, but at the same time, we cannot use a wide range of superpositions). Moreover, we can obtain another lower bound for the case where "big pans" and "small pans" are both available but "medium pans" are not (Theorem 6). Unfortunately one can see that there is still a gap between the sizes of the big pans and small pans even for a weakest nontrivial (ω(1)) lower bound. See Appendix C for the details of these results.
Lower Bounds for the Quasi B-Oracle
Second, we show that our upper bound is tight under the random-partition property. Notice that in this case, if the coins include an odd number of false ones, then the scale is always tilted, and if the coins include an even number (=m) of false ones, the scale will be balanced with probability 1/ √ m. Thus in order to show a lower bound, we need to generalize the adversary method that works for such "stochastic" oracles: Now ζ(x; q) is a random variable and the stochastic version of O x , denoted by O x , is defined as (we should be careful not to lose its unitarity):
Now Lemma 3 changes to the following: Proof. The proof follows that of [20, Theorem 14] essentially; in the following we mainly describe the difference. Assume that there is a T -query quantum algorithm A computing f with high probability. Note that the initial state of A is |ψ 0 x = |0 for any input x. The final state for input x can be written as |ψ
for some unitary transformations U 0 , . . . , U T −1 . Since A computes f with high probability, there is some constant ǫ < 1 such that | ψ T x |ψ T y | ≤ ǫ for any x and y with f (
For any x and y with f (x) = f (y), we can represent After querying to the oracle, we have (1 − P 00,q − P 11,q )α * q,a,z β q,a,z +(−1) a ( P 01,q α * q,a,z β q,a⊕1,z − P 10,q α * q,a,z β q,a⊕1,z )
since Pr[ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q)] = 1, that is, P 00,q + P 11,q = 1 implies that P 00,q = 1 or P 11,q = 1. By the triangle inequality,
(1 − P 00,q − P 11,q )|α q,a,z ||β q,a,z | + ( P 01,q + P 10,q )|α q,a,z ||β q,a⊕1,z | ≤   T   k=1 q,a,z Pr[ζ(x;q) =ζ(y;q)]>0
[( P 01,q + P 10,q )(|α q,a,z ||β q,a,z | + |α q,a,z ||β q,a⊕1,z |)].
The remaining part is completely similar to the proof of [20, Theorem 14] . Summing up the inequalities for all (x, y) ∈ S×S with weight w(x, y), we have (1−ǫ) x,y w(x, y) ≤ 2T µ(x)µ(y) ν(x, q)ν(y, q) 1 ( P 01,q + P 10,q ) 2 .
Therefore, we obtain T = Ω( √ A) and hence the proof is completed. Now we define the stochastic version of our B-oracle by setting
where x and q are N -bit strings, and x ∧ q is the N -bit string obtained by the bitwise AND of x and q. We call this oracle the quasi B-oracle and one can see that it simulates the B-oracle with the random-partition property. Now we are ready to give the upper and lower bounds for the query complexity of this quasi B-oracle. Assume that wt(x) = k. The upper bound is easy by modifying Theorem 1 so that Step 2 in F ind * (k) can be replaced with O(k 1/4 ) repetitions of the quasi B-oracle.
Theorem 3
There is an O(k 1/4 )-query quantum algorithm to find x using the quasi B-oracle.
On the contrary, we can obtain the tight lower bound by using Lemma 5. The weight scheme contrasts with that of Theorem 2; w(x, y) is nonzero only if the Hamming distance between x and y is 2.
Theorem 4 Any quantum algorithm with the quasi B-oracle needs
Proof. First we define a weight scheme. Let S = {x ∈ {0, 1} N | wt(x) = k} and f (x) = x. In what follows, we assume that wt(q) = l for the q that provides the minimum value of the formula of Lemma 5 and show that the theorem holds for an arbitrary l ≤ N . For any (x, y) ∈ S × S, let w(x, y) = 1 if d(x, y) = 2 and 0 otherwise. We must satisfy w ′ (x, y, q) = 0 for any different x, y such that d(x, y) = 2 or Pr[ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q)] = 1, which implies wt(x ∧ q) = wt(y ∧ q). Thus we let w ′ (x, y, q) = 0 only if d(x, y) = 2 and wt(x ∧ q) = wt(y ∧ q) ± 1. Define w ′ (x, y, q) as a function of wt(x ∧ q) = m 1 and wt(y ∧ q) = m 2 , and thus denote it by w ′ (x, y, q) = w ′ (m 1 , m 2 ). Then w ′ (m 1 , m 2 ) is taken as
It can be easily seen that w, w ′ is a weight scheme. Now we evaluate the lower bound under this weight scheme. Clearly, µ(x) = µ(y) = k(N −k). For evaluating ν(x, q)ν(y, q), we consider only the case where m 1 = wt(x ∧ q) = 2m and m 2 = wt(y ∧ q) = 2m − 1 (the other cases such as m 1 = 2m and m 2 = 2m + 1 can be similarly analyzed). In this case, we have
Note that since Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0] = 1/2m and Pr[ζ(y; q) = 1] = 1, P 01,q = 1/ √ 2m and P 10,q = 0. Thus we have µ(x)µ(y) ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
This value is bounded below by Ω(k 1/2 ) since m ≤ k/2 and l ≤ N . Now Lemma 5 completes the proof.
By a geometric view (Theorem 4 in [6] ) similar to the Grover search where the fraction of correct solution(s) is 1/4 [5] , we can verify that F ind(k) succeeds with certainty. In F ind(k), the "solution" is |X R |1 R ′ where X is the k false coins. Notice that Step (ii) implements the transformation that changes |X R |b R ′ to −|X R |b R ′ if (X, b) is the "solution" and |X R |b R ′ otherwise. The total complexity is the number of queries to run F ind * (k) and its inverse three times (once for Step (i) and twice for Step (iii)) plus the number of queries to run Check and its inverse. So, we obtain a query complexity of O(k 1/4 ) if Check has a similar complexity.
In fact, Check needs only O(log k) queries, which is given as follows. For simplicity, we assume that N is a multiple of k + 1 and k + 1 is a power of 2 but the generalization is easy. (Note that the following algorithm satisfies the big-pan property. If we do not care the property, the algorithm can be simplified a lot.)
Algorithm Check.
Input: Two subsets of a set X of N coins, X 1 with size k and X 1 = X \ X 1 with size N − k. Output: YES iff the coins in X 1 are all false and the coins in X 1 are all fair. Finally, we adapt our algorithm so that it can satisfy the big-pan property. We simulate the transformation | q → (−1) q·x | q of the IP oracle by replacing a query string q ∈ {0, 1} N with even Hamming weight l by two queries with Hamming weight ⌊N/2⌋ when l/2 is even (similarly for the case where it is odd). We replace q by two N -bit strings q 1 and q 2 with Hamming weight l/2 such that q = q 1 ⊕ q 2 . We take an arbitrary N -bit string b with wt( b) = ⌊N/2⌋ − l/2 such that I( b) ∩ I( q) = ∅. Note that both q 1 ⊕ b and q 2 ⊕ b have Hamming weight ⌊N/2⌋. (Recall that the Hamming weight of query strings must be even. So, if ⌊N/2⌋ is odd, then we need an adjustment (−1) of the Hamming weight when selecting b.) Since (−1) ( q 1 ⊕ b)·x (−1) ( q 2 ⊕ b)·x = (−1) q·x for any x, we can replace a query q to the IP oracle by two queries q 1 ⊕ b and q 2 ⊕ b. Thus, we can simulate F ind * (k) without changing the complexity (up to a constant factor).
C Other Lower Bounds for Restricted Pans
In addition to Theorem 2, we can show more lower bounds for the case where the size of pans is restricted. In what follows, L ≤ l denotes the restriction that at most l coins must be placed on the pans whenever the balance is used.
First, we give a lower bound for the case where the size of pans is "small." Note that Theorem 5 implies that there is no o(k 1/4 )-query algorithm placing at most O(N/ √ k) coins on the pans whenever the balance is used.
Theorem 5 If L ≤ l, then we need Ω( kN/l min(k, l)) weighings. In particular, we need Ω( N/l) weighings.
Proof. For simplicity, the following weight scheme is given when the size of each pan is l (that is, when q ∈ Q l ). But the same bound is also obtained similarly when the size is at most l, and hence we can apply Lemma 3 for Q = l ′ ≤l Q l ′ to obtain the desired bound in the last of this proof. Let S = {x ∈ {0, 1} N | wt(x) = k} and f (x) = x. For (x, y) ∈ S × S, let w(x, y) = 1 if d(x, y) = 2 (where d(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between x and y) and 0 otherwise. When the query q for x means that m 1 and m 2 false coins are placed on the left and right pans, respectively, and q for y means that m 3 and m 4 false coins are placed on the left and right pans, respectively, we put the same weight for all w ′ (x, y, q)'s of such triples (x, y, q), which is denoted as w ′ ((m 1 , m 2 ), (m 3 , m 4 ) ). Then we define 
It is easy to see that the condition of a weight scheme is satisfied. Notice that for any x ∈ S we have µ(x) = k(N − k). Evaluating ν(x, q) is a bit complicated. Since this value depends on the numbers of false coins on the two pans, m 1 and m 2 , represented by the pair (x, q), we denote it by ν(m 1 , m 2 ). We want to evaluate ν(x, q)ν(y, q) such that w(x, y) > 0, i.e., d(x, y) = 2 and χ(x; q) = χ(y; q). By symmetry, we can assume that χ(x; q) = 1 and χ(y; q) = 0. Since d(x, y) = 2, we need to consider only the following cases: (i) ν(x, q) = ν(m, m − 1) (or = ν(m − 1, m)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m, m) (where 0 < m ≤ min(k/2, l)); (ii) ν(x, q) = ν(m + 1, m − 1) (or = ν(m−1, m+1)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m, m) (where 0 < m < min(k/2, l)); (iii) ν(x, q) = ν(m+1, m) (or = ν(m, m + 1)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m, m) (where 0 ≤ m < min(k/2, l)). In case of (i), This completes the proof.
Second, we generalize Theorem 2 to the case where "big pans" and "small pans" are both available but "medium pans" are not. Here, "L ≤ l 1 or L ≥ l 2 " means that at most l 1 coins or at least l 2 coins (or their superposition) must be placed on the pans whenever the balance is used. Since c ≥ 3 and k ≤ N/2, we can see that the following holds:
This completes the proof.
Hence the proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
Unfortunately, Theorem 6 does not give even a weakest nontrivial lower bound ω(1) if the size of the pans is not restricted. One might have the hope by Theorem 6 that we could obtain a good upper bound by always placing approximately N/k coins on the pans, but Theorem 5 denies such a hope since we have an Ω(k 1/2−2ǫ ) lower bound for l = N/k 1−4ǫ .
